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Toward the end of The New Right and the Constitution: Turning
Back the Legal Clock, Bernard Schwartz states: "The constantly
evolving nature of constitutional doctrine has alone enabled our
system to make the transition from the eighteenth to the twentieth century."' With those words, Schwartz recaps and explains
the book's principal argument: that New Right constitutional theory, which specifically rejects the notion of an organic, evolving
constitution, "would turn back the constitutional clock by two
centuries and fossilize our public law." '2 By juxtaposing the New
Right's reliance on "original intention" against the settled notion that the Constitution "must be construed to meet the changing needs of different periods,"' Schwartz effectively illustrates
that New Right thinking reflects a significant departure from our
constitutional jurisprudence.
But Schwartz's attack on the New Right ideology is not limited to disproving the notion that constitutional construction
should turn solely on the framers' intentions. He goes on to discredit a whole range of mainstream and radical New Right tenets
and arguments, principally by showing the anachronistic and
often frightening results they would work. Schwartz repeatedly
demonstrates that in practice, as in theory, New Right analysis of
the Constitution would ignore Holmes' "felt necessities of the
time,"' 4 leaving many members of the public sadly bereft of its
protections. Schwartz accomplishes his repudiation of the New
Right approach by analyzing various New Right positions on
their own terms, examining academically each argument, from
original intention to Judge Posner's economic analysis of individ* B.A., Drew University, 1980;J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law, 1984,
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4 Id. at 8 (quoting HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)).

540

1991]

BOOK REVIEW

541

ual rights and Professor Epstein's radical expansion of the fifth
amendment takings clause.
By carefully dissecting and debunking a broad range of New
Right positions, Schwartz resists the temptation to dismiss even
the most extreme of those notions as too wrongheaded to have
any real impact on American law. That is good, because New
Right philosophy has had an increasing impact on judicial decisionmaking over the past decade. Unfortunately, however,
Schwartz's careful scholarly approach to New Right philosophy is
not without its drawbacks. In elevating New Right constitutional
theory to the status of a "juristic philosophy," Schwartz does not
expose it for what it really is: a hodgepodge of result-oriented
notions, by turns judicially activist and restrained, bound together only by the conservative political agenda they advance.
Perhaps as an additional byproduct of his academic approach to New Right theory, Schwartz understates its significant
political implications. The clash between New Right theorists
and more traditional legal thinkers is not merely an academic debate. Over the past decade, the Reagan and Bush administrations have attempted, with great fervor, to pack the federal courts
with New Right ideologues. Nevertheless, Schwartz says precious little about those attempts to reshape the judiciary. Hence,
although Schwartz devotes an entire chapter to proving that New
Right jurisprudence does, in fact, matter, he never states the
most important reason why it matters: because it is an anachronistic, long-repudiated philosophy, totally out of sync with our
developed society, which is taking root through the blatant
politicization of the judicial selection process.
Nevertheless, Schwartz's book is an outstanding contribution to the legal literature, confronting and persuasively disproving New Right notions in a manner largely accessible to lay
readers and lawyers alike. If it does not sound the clarion call
about the immediate threat these theories pose, it provides an
excellent and compelling analysis of the reasoning on which they
are based.
Schwartz's first target is the New Right contention that constitutional construction should turn entirely on the intention of
the framers, perhaps the defining notion of New Right jurisprudence. Correctly identifying original intention as "one of those
delusively simple concepts that promises a facile solution to the
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most difficult of our legal problems," ' 5 Schwartz promptly. repudiates the concept by showing that the framers' precise intentions
are often unknowable and, more important, largely irrelevant.
Despite Robert Bork's claim that "[w]e have abundant sources
for an understanding of particular provisions of the Constitution, ' Schwartz demonstrates that the only hard evidence of the
framers' intentions - the record of proceedings at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 - is "strikingly incomplete."' 7 He also
notes the difficulty in identifying the particular framers whose intent is to govern. Most convincingly, however, Schwartz argues
that the original intention of the framers, even if ascertainable,
should not determine the meaning to be afforded the Constitution through the ages. Paraphrasing Cardozo, Schwartz explains
that "[t]he Constitution states, not rules for the passing hour, but
principles for an ever-expanding future.' Schwartz continues:
"With a basic document such as ours, drawn in so many particulars with purposed vagueness, constitutional law must be more
than machinelike exegesis of a fundamental text." 9
That the Constitution is "a living instrument that must be
construed so as to meet the practical necessities of government
during each period in the nation's history"' l is a basic premise
one either accepts or rejects. Recognizing that fact, Schwartz refuses to engage in a lengthy harangue about the evolving, elastic
nature of the Constitution." Rather, he proceeds directly to an
examination of the untoward results that a contrary view of the
Constitution would engender. First, he seizes upon the question
of whether the framers intended to vest in Congress the power to
issue paper currency. This is an excellent example for Schwartz's
5 Id. at 7.
6 R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 165 (1989). Specifically, Bork notes:

We have, after all, the constitutional text, records of the Philadelphia
convention, records of ratifying conventions, the newspaper accounts
of the day, the Federalist Papers, the Anti-Federalists Papers, the constructions put upon the Constitution by early congresses in which
men who were familiar with its framing and ratification sat, the constructions put upon the document by executive branch officials similarly familiar with the Constitution's origins, and decisions of the early
courts, as well as treatises by men who, like Joseph Story, were thoroughly familiar with the thought of the time.
Id.
7 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 9.
8 Id. at 10 (citing CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 83 (1921)).
9 Id.
10 Id.

II Id. Compare R.
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supra note 6.
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purposes, for the framers clearly did not wish Congress to have
such power, although paper money is indispensable to our modem economy. Thus, in this instance, reliance on original intent
would compel a result - the invalidation of Congress' power to
issue currency - clearly unacceptable to even the most rigorous
New Right thinker. As Schwartz rightly observes, "[o]riginal intention had been tried and ultimately found wanting, even
though this was the one case where the framers' intent was as
12
clear as it could possibly be."'
Schwartz accomplishes a similar repudiation of original intention with respect to the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Noting that at the time
the Constitution was adopted, punishments such as maiming or
disfiguring criminals were very much in vogue, Schwartz observes that "the very element of degradation, which makes such
punishments repulsive to modem penology, was what made
them seem so suitable to a community in large part still dominated by the puritan ethic."'13 Again, even the most radical New
Right theorist would have to concede that some punishments
which were once viewed as suitable are simply no longer acceptable to society. That is precisely why, as Schwartz observes, Chief
Justice Warren was correct in noting that the eighth amendment
"'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.' 14
Schwartz next turns to the due process and equal protection
clauses, which he aptly characterizes as the "crucial skeleton
clauses in the Constitution."' 5 Noting that the original intention
behind the due process clause was clearly to ensure procedural,
as opposed to substantive, safeguards against the deprivation of
life, liberty and property, Schwartz demonstrates that today, such
a reading would eviscerate the constitutional provision most responsible for maintaining "the balance between authority and
liberty."' 6 Most notably, Schwartz explains that were the due
process clause read not to ensure substantive limitations on arbitrary governmental power, the Supreme Court's decision outlawing segregation in the Washington, D.C. public schools' 7 would
not have been possible. Similarly, if the equal protection clause
12
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13 Id. at 16.
14 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
15 Id. at 17.
16 Id. at 21.
17
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were read in light of the framers' intentions, the decision outlawing segregation in the public schools throughout the country'"
could not have been reached.
Schwartz goes on to reveal the inadequacy of original intention in interpreting the first amendment's establishment clause.
Specifically, Schwartz examines Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in an establishment clause case, in which the Chief Justice concluded that the framers sought only to prohibit a national religion, or perhaps to proscribe discrimination among religious
sects, but not to require government neutrality regarding
religion. 19
Clearly, the framers saw the establishment of a national religion as inimical to their newly won and much cherished religious
freedom. What they could not have seen, prior to living under a
system in which church and State were separate entities, were the
many opportunities for an implicit establishment of a religion or
religions -

through the granting of preferences, etc.

-

which

have since been found violative of the establishment clause. It is
only with the benefit of experience under such a system that our
courts can continue to understand the spirit and articulate the
evolving meaning of the establishment clause. To use history in
construing the establishment clause, as Schwartz correctly notes,
"is to ask questions of the past that the past cannot answer."' 20
Having demonstrated the wholesale inadequacy, in theory
and in practice, of the original intention approach to constitutional construction, Schwartz moves to the other basic premise of
the New Right: that constitutional protection should not be extended to rights not specifically enumerated in that instrument.
Again, the notion of an organic constitution is integral to
Schwartz's repudiation of the New Right's insistence on strict
constructionism. In this context, Schwartz relies, most persuasively, on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,2 ' where the
Court refused to invalidate the ban on contraceptives later found
unconstitutional in Griswold v. Connecticut.22 In that dissent,
Schwartz observes, Harlan expressly noted that it "is not the particular enumeration of rights .

.

. which spells out the reach of

constitutional protection. On the contrary, the 'character of
18 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
20
21
22

Id. at 33.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Constitutional provisions... must be discerned from a particular
provision's larger context. And . . . this context is one not of

words, but of history and purposes.'"23
Although Schwartz also relies on the ninth amendment's language that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,"' 24 his principal argument for recognizing
rights, like the right of privacy, which are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution is identical to his argument for rejecting
the original intention approach to constitutional construction.
The question of what specific rights fall within the Constitution's
broad outlines must be determined according to the needs of an
evolving society. "Each new claim to Constitutional protection
... must be considered against a background of Constitutional

purposes, as 5they have been rationally perceived and historically
2
developed."

Having repudiated the two main principles of mainstream
New Right constitutional theory, original intention and strict
construction, Schwartz next focuses on the foremost proponents
of New Right extremism. His first target is Professor Bernard
Siegan, whose nomination by President Reagan for a federal appellate judgeship was rejected by the SenateJudiciary Committee
in 1988. Remarkably, Siegan contends that the Supreme Court
should revive its long-discredited reasoning in Lochner v. New
York 26 and once again use the due process clause to invalidate
laws which restrict freedom of contract or otherwise impinge on
the right of property. Under Siegan's analysis, substantive due
process is a tool that the Court can and should use to strike down
statutes based on unsound economic theory - which, in his view,
includes any law that conflicts with the laissez faire economics of
a century ago.
Although Holmes' dissent in Lochner, with its famous line,
"The [fQourteenth [a]mendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statistics," ' 27 has been settled law for over fifty
years, Schwartz patiently examines and discredits Siegan's theory
23 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 67 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 540, 541, 542-43
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
25 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 70 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 544).
26 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, under the guise of the contracts clause, the
Court invalidated a state health law prohibiting bakery employees from working
more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week.
27 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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on its own terms. Indeed, rather than rely on the Holmes truism
rejecting the social Darwinism of Lochner, Schwartz correctly
notes that Justice Harlan's Lochner dissent "in many ways
probed more deeply into the issues at stake.""8 As Schwartz explains, "According to Harlan, it was not for the Court to consider
whether any particular view of the economic issues involved
presented the sounder theory. If there were reasons to support
the view that excessive hours worked by bakers might endanger
2 9
their health, that should end the matter."1

Unfortunately, Schwartz offers a less than satisfactory explanation for modern courts' greater willingness to invalidate laws
that impinge on personal rights than those that restrict economic
rights as a function of social evolution. As Schwartz somewhat
cryptically describes it, quoting Rudolf von Ihering, "Formerly
high valuing of property, lower valuing of the person. Now lower
valuing of property, higher valuing of the person."" ° He does
not specifically address the apparent inconsistency between approving the use of substantive due process to protect personal
rights but disapproving its use to safeguard economic rights. Instead, he relies on a general discussion of the history of American
labor during the last century to dispel the notion that they are
inconsistent. As Schwartz explains, the prevailing view at the
turn of the century "was that the community had no legitimate
interest in the regulation of labor because the condition of inequality between the parties that justifies infringement of freedom
of contract did not exist. ' 31 Schwartz continues, "Such an approach was rendered obsolete by modern industrial society. The
helplessness of the individual employee, unaided by government
or collective action with his fellows, has been a basic fact of labor
history since the industrial revolution. "-2
Despite its lack of clarity Schwartz's approval of the somewhat tenous dichotomy between personal and economic rights is
in keeping with his overriding theme that the Constitution is a
28 B. ScnwARz, supra note 1, at 75.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 79 (quoting Ihering, quoted in 1 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, 429-30

(1959)).
31 Id. at 90.
32 Id. at 91. Professor Laurence Tribe offers a much more satisfactory explanation for the apparent inconsistency in modem courts' treatment of economic and
non-economic rights. As Tribe succinctly notes, "[tjhe point of Lochner's downfall
was not the rejection of human freedom as an idea, but the recognition that there
was less of such freedom, in the ordinary workings of the economy, than sometimes
met the eye." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrIUIONAL LAW 1336 (1988).
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living document adaptable to the needs of each era. To
Schwartz, this means that in the post-industrial age, this means
that laws which impinge on personal rights deny due process
while those which remedy economic imbalance do not.
From Siegan's attempt to revive Lochner, Schwartz turns to
Professor Epstein's expansive view of the fifth amendment takings clause. That clause 'provides: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."" 3 Epstein contends that any governmental diminution in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of property constitutes a taking under the
fifth amendment.
In rejecting that radical view, which has little to do with the
text of the fifth amendment or any plausible intention of the
framers, Schwartz explains how Epstein's theory would completely eviscerate the traditional police power to restrict or infringe upon a use of property that threatens the public welfare.'
He goes on to explain that Epstein's view would also invalidate
progressive taxation and all governmental redistributive programs, including unemployment insurance and welfare
assistance.35
After describing Epstein's extreme views and explaining that
they are contrary to any plausible interpretation of the Constitution, Schwartz includes a useful discussion of recent caselaw that
suggests that the Epstein view has begun to have an incremental
impact on judicial decisionmaking. Schwartz persuasively and
frighteningly argues that recent Supreme Court and lower court
opinions have relied increasingly on a reading of the takings
clause consistent with Epstein's. In his powerful repudiation of
Epstein's theory and his explicit acknowledgement that courts
have begun to adopt that theory, Schwartz performs perhaps his
most valuable function: demonstrating the pragmatic effect of
New Right thinking on society as we know it.
Schwartz's next subject is Professor Lino Graglia, who has
written what Schwartz describes as "a violent polemic against the
[Supreme Court's] decisions on school segregation. ' 36 Although
Graglia and other New Right jurists object to the Court's conclusion that segregation denoted and perpetuated black inferiority,
they agree that Brown v. Board of Education was correctly decided.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
35 Id. at 126-27.
36

Id. at 137.

1, at 126.
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Graglia objects, however, to the Court's orders implementing its
desegregation rulings. He contends that the Court's resort to its
equity powers to eradicate segregation was unauthorized and unnecessary. Additionally, Graglia lashes out at affirmative action
programs as instances of reverse discrimination. For his part,
Schwartz correctly notes that "the elimination of segregation
could not realistically be left to elected representatives.", 7 Further, he notes, in implementing its desegregation orders, "the
Court was only exercising the traditional enforcement powers of
courts of equity, which rested on the principle that the chancellor
may order whatever may be deemed necessary to correct the
38
wrong done in the given case."1

As to Graglia's complaint about affirmative action programs,
Schwartz concedes that such programs present a dilemma not
present in desegregation cases because granting preferences to
members of some racial groups necessarily disadvantages members of other such groups. In Schwartz's view, however, the
Bakke3 9 decision adequately resolved that dilemma by outlawing
quotas but permitting the use of race as a factor in admissions
decisions.
Graglia's work, like that of Epstein and Siegan, has more to
do with reasoning backward from a result than with careful constitutional analysis. As he does throughout the book, however,
Schwartz meets Graglia's arguments with logic and grace. Moreover, he convincingly demonstrates that the Court's implementation of its desegregation orders and its approval of race as a
factor in admissions decisions are examples of an organic constitution responding to the needs of the day.4 0
37 Id. at 159.
38
39
40

Id. at 161.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
As the Bakke Court explained:
In ... [a consitutionally permissible] admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file,
yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats ....

The applicant who loses out on

the last available seat to another candidate receiving a 'plus' on the
basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or
had the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did
not outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would
have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no
basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 317-18.
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The final and perhaps most formidable legal thinker
Schwartz takes on is Judge Richard Posner of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Posner is the foremost
proponent of the economic view of law Schwartz attacks in a
As
chapter entitled "Priceless Rights Made Worthless."
Schwartz explains, "[t]he primary criterion for those who see economics as the foundation of law is efficiency, and to them, efficiency is best promoted by the free operation of the market." ' 4'
Schwartz continues, "Thus, they are drawn inevitably to the Lochner rationale - that governmental interference with the 4market
2
promotes inefficiency and must be considered arbitrary."
Schwartz goes on to explore judge Posner's efficiency-based,
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in a variety of legal contexts. In ultimately repudiating this economic approach to law, Schwartz
explains:
CBA in constitutional law reduces our basic rights to the level
of the counting house. Those rights were placed in the organic charter "as fundamental choices of principle, not as instrumental calculations of utility or as pseudo-scientific
calibrations of social cost against social benefit - calculations
the decision makers
and calibrations whose essence is to deny
43
personal responsibility for choosing.
Despite the facial appeal of Posner's theory, which - like original
intention - promises a simple solution to a difficult problem, it is
not a suitable replacement for human decisionmaking. Moreover, in
constitutional analysis, CBA does not really replace qualitative judgments with quantitative ones. Before Posner's "purely mathematical" calculation is undertaken, the decisionmaker necessarily makes
value judgments about the rights at issue. Those decidedly qualitative choices, which inevitably devalue individual rights, are simply
masked beneath the economist's ostensibly value-neutral, quantitative equation. As Schwartz correctly concludes, "[a] system that values basic rights in more than dollars-and-cents terms should
hesitate before following an approach according to which, priceless
44
may too often mean worthless."
Having revealed the fundamental flaw in Judge Posner's economic analysis of law, Schwartz devotes his next chapter to a lengthy
discussion of the effect New Right thinking would have on our administrative law. It is here that Schwartz is most in danger of losing
41 B. SCHWARTZ,
42 Id.

supra note 1, at 164.

43 Id. at 179 (quoting L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES iii).
44

Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).
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the lay reader. His point is an important one: that New Right theorists would transform independent federal agencies into agents of
the President. The essence of the New Right's position is that independent agencies like the ICC and the FTC violate separation of
powers since they are responsible for implementing statutes, but are
not subject to the unlimited removal power of the President. Unfortunately, Schwartz's analysis of that position is mired in a somewhat
convoluted discussion of Supreme Court rulings on the subject.
Schwartz clarifies the issue with the help of the justices' letters and
conference notes, to which he was permitted access in writing this
book. Those materials not only permit the reader rare insights into
the justices' views on independent agencies and the separation of
powers, but also demonstrate the evolving, sometimes compromisedriven process of Supreme Court decisionmaking. As Schwartz ultimately explains, "the object of the laws ... setting up... independent agencies is to give to the citizen a guaranty that his case will be
45
decided by them in independence of the political executive."
Schwartz concludes, "It is as legitimate to give effect to that guarantee as it is to safeguard the tenure of a judge from executive
interference. "46
From the many New Right notions Schwartz carefully explores,
it becomes quite clear that New Right thinking would have a dramatic and undesirable effect on our system ofjurisprudence. In the
book's penultimate chapter, entitled "New Right on the Bench,"
Schwartz examines opinions by Justice Scalia and Circuit Judges
Posner and Alex Kozinski to determine whether and to what extent
those opinions reflect the New Right philosophy of their authors.
Not surprisingly, Schwartz uncovers a clear New Right bent in the
opinions of all three, fromJustice Scalia's strict interpretation of the
separation of powers doctrine to Judge Posner's reliance on economic theory in labor relations cases and Judge Kozinski's invalidation of a rent control ordinance as violative of the takings clause.
Schwartz segues neatly from that chapter's alarming message to
the question posed in the book's final chapter, "Does New Right
Jurisprudence Matter?" Schwartz concludes, of course, that it does
matter, for a variety of reasons. The danger, as Schwartz sees it, is
not that New Right philosophy "will suddenly be elevated to the
level of accepted judicial doctrine,"'47 but that such theories will take
root incrementally, altering our settled jurisprudence bit by bit. In
Id. at 219.
Id.
47 Id. at 255.
45

46
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this regard, Schwartz credits not only the "academic scribblers" 4
themselves, but law clerks who, "fresh from exposure to New Right
doctrine"4 9 in law schools, quickly "translate what they have learned
into the law of the land." 5
Schwartz is right, of course, about the incremental change New
Right academics and their students-turned-law clerks can work upon
American law. What he does not focus on is the remarkable speed
with which New Right theorists are being elevated to the federal
bench. Although neither Robert Bork nor Professor Siegan gained
Senate approval, the Senate Judiciary Committee has rejected precious few judicial nominees in the past ten years. 5 ' And given the
nature of the Committee's screening process, it is unlikely that any
but the most outspoken extremists will fail to pass muster in the
future.
Although Bernard Schwartz does not call attention to the recent rash of New Right appointments to the federal bench, his careful, scholarly work does a great service to the people of this country.
With few exceptions indeed, the very important ideas expressed in
The New Right and the Constitution: Turning Back the Legal Clock are set
forth with great clarity, making them accessible to a very broad readership. It is to -be hoped that this book, with its timely warning
about the real-life consequences of New Right theory, will find its
way into the hands of that readership. For only a public fully informed as to the threat of New Right extremism can act to prevent
that philosophy from taking hold.
48 Id. at 254.
49 Id. at 263.
50 Id.

51 Biskupic, Bush Boosts Bench Strength of ConservativeJudges,49 CONG. Q. 171, 173
(Jan. 19, 1991).

